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Securities regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing and
providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds. Texas has
two major statutes to combat securities fraud: The Texas Securities Act
(TSA) and the Texas Stock Fraud Act (TSFA).1 Since the legislature
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 to 581-600; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 27.01.
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modeled the fraud provisions of the TSA on the federal statutes,2 Texas
courts use federal decisions under the federal statutes to interpret the
TSA’s similar language.3 This article, therefore, includes U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cases involving state law and securities fraud
under federal law. The author does not intend for this article to exhaust
all aspects of securities regulation but rather to update the Texas-based
securities practitioner on new Texas developments of interest during the
period of December 1, 2018 to November 30, 2019.
I. COVERAGE OF THE FEDERAL AND TEXAS
SECURITIES ACTS
The definitions, especially those relating to what constitutes a security
and the persons liable, determine the fraudulent transactions subject to
the securities acts.4 With respect to the transactions constituting securi-
ties, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought before the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit two oil and gas investments, both
designed as joint ventures seeking to avoid compliance with the securities
laws since their investment vehicle did not involve a security.5 The Fifth
Circuit also considered whether the grant of employee options consti-
tuted a “sale” of a security for purposes of the securities laws.6 The Fifth
Circuit in addition joined the Texas Supreme Court in finding life settle-
ments as securities when dealing with an investment advisor advising cli-
ents on investments in life settlements.7 With respect to the persons liable
for improperly selling securities, a Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals
considered the impact of free speech on aiders and abettors under a
Texas statute.8
A. JOINT VENTURE INTERESTS AS SECURITIES
The SEC brought two actions against oil and gas drilling ventures that
used cold-calling methods to attract investors then subsequently provided
them with a private placement memorandum and a joint venture agree-
2. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581–33 cmt. (Comment to 1977 Amendment);
House Comm. of Fin. Insts., Tex. S.B. 469, 65th Leg., R.S. (1977).
3. See, e.g., Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v.
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 102 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see
also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1129–30 n.3 (2013)
(discussing Highland Capital Mgmt.); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 60 SMU
L. REV. 1293–1302 (2007) (discussing Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc.).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)–(3) (2012); TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A)–(B).
5. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Sethi, 910 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 95 (2019); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Arcturus Corp., 928 F.3d 400, 400 (5th Cir. 2019).
6. Lampkin v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 925 F.3d 727, 727 (5th Cir. 2019).
7. In the Matter of Living Benefits Asset Mgmt., LLC, 916 F.3d 528, 528 (5th Cir.
2010).
8. Smith v. Crestview NUV, LLC, 565 S.W.3d 793, 793 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018,
pet. denied).
2020] Securities Regulation 365
ment.9 In both cases, the SEC filed for violation of the fraud rules of the
Securities Act and Exchange Act.10 In both cases the district court
granted summary judgment for the SEC.11 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the first one in SEC v. Sethi,12 and reversed and
remanded the second one in SEC v. Arcturus Corp.13
The Fifth Circuit noted that in the Fifth Circuit general partnership in-
terests usually are not securities because the general partners are actively
involved in the enterprise and are able to protect their own interests;
however, it also noted that a general partnership can be a security if the
general partners lack managerial powers.14 In the Fifth Circuit, this latter
situation is determined by examining three factors and if one is present
shows the general partner interest is a security: whether (1) the agree-
ment leaves general partners with little managerial powers; (2) the gen-
eral partners are so inexperienced or unknowledgeable that they cannot
exercise their powers; or (3) the general partners are so dependent on the
manager they cannot replace the manager.15 In Sethi, the joint venture
satisfied this first factor test. Although the agreement gave the joint ven-
turers power to call meetings on a 20% vote, develop rules on a 50%
vote, and veto the manager’s decisions, these powers were illusionary
since the manager never called any meetings, blocked any attempt to call
meetings, failed to inform the general partners of management’s deci-
sions, or blocked any attempt to obtain information.16
But in Arcturus Corp., the joint venture failed the first factor test that
the joint venturers lacked the ability to exercise control. The joint ventur-
ers had the power to remove and veto the manager, and the joint ventur-
ers actually met, voted, and managed the drilling projects.17 The
agreement included a provision allowing a joint venturer to vote for com-
pletion of a well or opt out of the joint venture, depicted by the SEC as a
requirement to follow the recommendation of the manager, rather than
as a method to cut a joint venturer’s loss before incurring completion
costs. 18 The SEC also claimed the joint venturers had to rely on little
information supplied by the manager; however, the record showed the
joint venturers had several sources of information, including daily drilling
9. Sethi, 910 F.3d at 201; Arcturus Corp., 928 F.3d at 405–06 (investment adviser also
determining whether the investors were accredited).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (2019).
11. Sethi, 910 F.3d at 198; Arcturus Corp., 928 F.3d at 400.
12. Sethi, 910 F.3d at 208.
13. Arcuturs Corp., 928 F.3d at 424.
14. Sethi, 910 F.3d at 203 (citing Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986));
Arcturus Corp., 928 F.3d at 410 (citing Youmans, 791 F.2d at 346).
15. Sethi, 910 F.3d at 204 (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.
1981)); Arcturus Corp., 928 F.3d at 410–11 (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
16. Sethi, 910 F.3d at 205. On the securities fraud issue, the manager had made claims
of prior relations with major oil companies, the misstatement, which relations he knew he
lacked, providing the scienter, so the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of
securities fraud. Id. at 207–08.
17. Arcturus Corp., 928 F.3d at 412–13.
18. Id. at 413–15.
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reports, email updates, and visits to the drilling site. 19 The SEC further
claimed the joint venturers could not contact each other since the man-
ager protected joint venturer contact information as confidential under
privacy laws, but the record showed the joint venturers contacted each
other at joint venturer meetings and thereafter by phone.20 The Fifth Cir-
cuit left it for the district court to determine whether 160 joint venturers
was too many for them to exercise their management rights.21
With respect to the second factor test that the joint venturers were in-
experienced and unknowledgeable, the SEC claimed advertising in large-
city newspapers and the cold-calling technique of recruitment led to inex-
perienced joint venturers.22 Although the record showed four inexperi-
enced joint venturers, it also showed that several joint venturers had past
experience or had advisers helping them make decisions and that the
manager required the joint venturers to be accredited investors, but infor-
mation on only 25 of 340 joint venturers was insufficient for a decision.23
With respect to the third factor test that the joint venturers were de-
pendent on the manager, the SEC contended the manager was irreplacea-
ble as being the party to the subcontracts and controlling all the joint
venturers’ invested funds.24 The Fifth Circuit found insufficient evidence
on this factor in the record; nothing showed the funds belonged to the
manager and not the joint venture and there was no evidence the joint
venture could not enforce the contracts with the subcontractors.25 So, the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.26
B. THE IMPACT OF A SERVICE AGREEMENT ON DETERMINING
WHETHER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
ARE SECURITIES
Generally, the ability to participate in the management of a limited
partnership by a limited partner means the limited partnership interest is
not a security.27 In Masel v. Villarreal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered an unusual situation where the securities fraud
defendants were the limited partners or investors, while the plaintiffs
were the general partners and had set up the business.28 The defendant
investors had induced the plaintiff businessmen to enter into a joint busi-
ness enterprise for a medical billing service for a particular medical test,
19. Id. at 415–16.
20. Id. at 416–17.
21. Id. at 417.
22. Id. at 418–19.
23. Id. at 418–21.
24. Id. at 422.
25. Id. at 422–24.
26. Id. at 424.
27. See Frazier v. Manson, 651 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1981). The Frazier limited
partnership had a limited partner who was also a general partner in the entity that served
as the general partner of the limited partnership so that partner’s limited partnership inter-
est was not a security. See Frazier v. Manson, 484 F. Supp. 449, 450–51 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
28. Masel v. Villarreal, 924 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 2019).
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and so, the plaintiff businessmen established a number of limited partner-
ships to provide the medical procedures and hired the defendant inves-
tors to manage the billing in exchange for limited partnership interests in
the various limited partnerships.29 The district court, in dismissing the
case for failure to state a securities fraud claim, did not address the issue
of whether the limited partnership interests were securities.30 The Fifth
Circuit noted that limited partnership interests ordinarily are securities as
an investment contract where the investor depends on the efforts of third
parties to make a return, and that investors who had managerial rights as
a general partner could not claim their related limited partnership inter-
ests were securities.31 But in distinguishing the latter situation, the Fifth
Circuit noted that those managerial powers came from the limited part-
nership formation documents, whereas in the current situation the mana-
gerial powers came from a separate service contract rather than from the
limited partnership formation documents.32 Consequently, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that the defendants’ limited partnership interests were se-
curities.33 The fraud aspects of the case will be discussed below.34
C. A GRANT OF EMPLOYEE OPTIONS IS NOT A “SALE”
OF SECURITIES
In the long ongoing Enron Corporation litigation, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with a lawsuit by former em-
ployees of Enron Corporation who had been granted employee stock op-
tions that they had not exercised. In Lampkin v. UBS Financial Services,
Inc., the former employees sued the underwriter’s retail brokerage under
the Securities Act35 and the underwriter’s investment banker under the
Exchange Act36 to recover from Enron Corporation’s underwriter for
failing to disclose material non-public information about Enron Corpora-
tion’s financial manipulations in Enron Corporation’s prospectuses and
registration statements while acting as a retail seller and investment
banker of Enron Corporation securities.37 The underwriter’s retail bro-
kerage served as the exclusive broker for the stock option exercises and
was tasked with facilitating the option exercises and providing record-
keeping services related to the exercise of the options.38 The district court
29. Id. at 739–41.
30. Id. at 742.
31. Id. at 743–45.
32. Id. at 745–46.
33. Id. at 746.
34. See infra notes 103–14 and accompanying text.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k (underwriter under a registration statement), 77l (2019) (offering
or selling a security). The TSA has similar provisions. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts.
581-33A(1) (untrue statement in a registration), 581-33A(2) (untrue statement in an offer
or sale of a security).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2019).
37. Lampkin v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 925 F.3d 727, 731 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 389 (2019).
38. Id.
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dismissed both actions.39 For the retail brokerage, the issue was whether
the grant of the option did not constitute a “sale” of a security since no
investment of money occurred.40 The Fifth Circuit noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court had previously determined that a noncontributory, com-
pulsory pension plan is not an investment contract (within the definition
of a “security”) since the purported investment on the part of the em-
ployee is a relatively insignificant part of the total and indivisible com-
pensation package of the employee.41 The Fifth Circuit noted further that
the SEC, following the Supreme Court’s ruling, had determined that
there is no sale of a security when shares of stock are contributed to the
employee plan without cost to the employee, and that courts have applied
the doctrine to employee stock option plans.42 Consequently, the Fifth
Circuit found that the grant of options is not a sale since labor is insuffi-
cient consideration in the context of a compulsory, noncontributory op-
tion plan.43 The Fifth Circuit left open the issue of the exercise of the
employee stock option, since the employees expressly disclaimed any reli-
ance on the exercise of the employee stock options.44
D. LIFE SETTLEMENTS AS SECURITIES
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became another Texas
court to face investments in life settlements. In In the Matter of Living
Benefits Asset Management, L.L.C., a bankrupt provider of consulting
services to a corporate client in connection with the purchase of life set-
tlements to use as collateral in corporate debt offerings brought an action
to recover for breach of contract when the corporate client failed to pay
the agreed fee.45 The bankruptcy court found the contract breached, but
that the bankrupt was required to register as an investment adviser under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA), had not registered, and so
the contract was voidable under the IAA and the bankrupt could not
recover the fee, an action affirmed by the district court.46 The bankrupt
39. Id. at 729.
40. Id. at 733–35.
41. Id. at 734 (first citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558–60
(1979)).
42. Id. at 734–35 (first citing Employee Benefits Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
6281, 21 SEC Docket 1372 (Jan. 15, 1981); then citing Interpretive Release on Regulation
D, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6455, 48 F.R. 100045 (Mar. 3,1983); and then citing In re
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544–45 (D. N.J. 1999)).
43. Id. at 737.
44. Id. at 736–37. The securities fraud issue against the underwriter’s investment
banker also failed for failing to establish a joint venture between the underwriter’s retail
brokerage and the underwriter’s investment banker. Id. at 737–40 (following Giancarlo v.
UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 725 F. App’x 278 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 199, 202
(2018)); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 391,
393–94 (2019) (discussing Giancarlo).
45. In the Matter of Living Benefits Asset Mgmt., LLC, 916 F.3d 528, 531–32 (5th Cir.
2019).
46. Id. at 532. The IAA makes it unlawful to practice as an investment adviser without
being registered and any contract in violation of the act is void. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(a)
(registration), 80b-15(b) (2019) (voidness).
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consulting provider contended it was not an investment adviser since life
settlements were not securities.47 The Fifth Circuit noted that the issue
was whether the life settlement was a security as an investment contract
which had three requirements, namely, an investment of money, second a
common enterprise, and third profits solely derived from the efforts of
others than the investors.48 The Fifth Circuit then noted that there was a
split amongst the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit only for the third factor on
whether profits came from the efforts of others before or after
purchase.49 The Fifth Circuit also observed that most courts follow the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, including Texas under the comparable TSA,50
and so concluded that life settlements were securities; the bankrupt had
therefore failed to register as an investment adviser, and so the contract
with the corporate client was void, thereby affirming the district court.51
E. THE IMPACT OF FREE SPEECH ON AIDERS AND ABETTORS
UNDER THE TSA
Texas has a statute against strategic lawsuits against public participa-
tion (the Anti-SLAPP statute) to protect both the constitutional rights to
free speech and association but also protect the right to file meritorious
lawsuits for demonstrable injury.52 This is done by shifting the burden of
proof upon a motion to dismiss with the movant first providing evidence
the action relates to its exercise of free speech, to petition, or to associate
and then the non-movant providing prima facie evidence of its claim.53 In
Smith v. Crestview NUV, LLC, the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals
received a motion under this statute against a claim for aiding and abet-
47. In the Matter of Living Benefits Asset Mgmt., LLC, 916 F.3d at 533. The bankrupt
also contended that it was not in the business of advising others as to the value of investing
in life settlements since it gave only general advice and not specific advice about specific
securities. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim since the SEC has determined the IAA
applies to those giving generalized advice on the advantages and disadvantages of investing
in securities and the act specifically covers advising others as to the advisability of investing
in securities. Id. at 534–35; Applicability of the Inv. Advisers Act to Fin. Planners, Pension
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Inv. Advisory Serv. as a Component of
Other Fin. Servs., SEC Interpretive Letter, 52 F.R. 38400-01 (1987); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11) (2019).
48. In the Matter of Living Benefits Asset Mgmt., LLC, 916 F.3d at 535 (citing Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946)).
49. Id. at 537; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 743–45
(11th Cir. 2005) (finding life settlements as securities by including presale efforts since such
efforts resemble the efforts made for bonds which are securities); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v.
Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545–48 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (a less than competent jurist failing
to find life settlements as securities by failing to consider presale efforts, thereby triggering
a dissent).
50. See Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660, 681 (Tex. 2015); George Lee
Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 437, 439–45 (2016) (discussing
Life Partners).
51. In the Matter of Living Benefits Asset Mgmt., LLC, 916 F.3d at 538–39, 543.
52. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.002, 27.011(b).
53. Id. §§ 27.005(b), 27.005(c).
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ting a securities fraud under the TSA.54 The perpetrator of the securities
fraud got the investor to invest in the perpetrator’s company in develop-
ing a rejuvenation product derived from human amniotic cells, indicating
the aider and abettor had agreed to be the provider of the product and
had injected the product in the perpetrator, which investment was spent
on the perpetrator’s personal expenses.55 The petition against the aider
and abettor referred to acts of assistance in clandestine testing of the
product, failing to keep medical records of the testing, and violations of
Texas medical laws.56 The district court denied the aider and abettor’s
motion to dismiss under the Texas Anti-SLAPP statute.57 The appellate
court quickly found that the Anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to this
securities fraud action since it did not contain allegations about communi-
cations necessary for an exercise of free speech and affirmed the trial
court.58 The court left open the issue of whether a petition for a TSA
violation by making a statement or submitting a document would be sub-
ject to the Anti-SLAPP statute.59
II. REGISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The TSA created the Texas State Securities Board (TSSB) to handle
the registrations required by the TSA and to serve as an enforcement
agency.60 The basic rule of most securities laws is that securities must be
registered with their corresponding regulatory agency unless they fall
within an exemption.61 Similarly, unless they fit an exemption from regis-
tration, sellers of securities must register before selling securities in the
state, and investment advisers must register before rendering investment
advice in the state.62 Enforcement actions generally focus on issuers fail-
ing to register their securities, and simultaneously their selling agents, and
making misleading statements to aid their sales.
A. RULEMAKING
At its most recent session, the Texas Legislature enacted a bill to pro-
vide for negotiated rulemaking for the TSSB under which the TSSB
meets with entities to be affected by a proposed rule and gets their input
into the proposed rule.63 Consequently, the TSSB adopted a rule to pro-
vide for the negotiated rulemaking process.64
54. Smith v. Crestview NUV, LLC, 565 S.W.3d 793, 793 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018,
pet. denied).
55. Id. at 794–95.
56. Id. at 796.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 798–99.
59. Id. at 799.
60. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-2.
61. See id. art. 581-7(A).
62. See id. art. 581-13(A).
63. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-2-8, added by 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
Ch. 772 (H.B. 1535).
64. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4789 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6857 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 103.6 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
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B. LICENSING OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS
The Texas legislature recently enacted two bills applicable to the licens-
ing of dealers and investment advisers. One bill enables potential appli-
cants with a criminal conviction to apply for an occupational license when
the criminal conviction does not relate to the occupation.65 The TSSB
amended its licensing rules to alter the factors that must be considered in
determining registration eligibility for dealers,66 investment advisers,67
and to allow these persons to obtain preliminary information regarding
their eligibility for an occupational license before they begin a training
program for the occupation.68 The other bill permits military spouses to
engage in a business requiring a license without the applicable license
provided they have a current license from another jurisdiction.69 So, the
TSSB amended its rule for military applicants to reflect the legislative
changes for dealers70 and investment advisers71 with a new form concern-
ing the waiver and requesting recognition of the license from that other
jurisdiction.72
C. REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION FOR BRANCH OFFICES
The Texas legislature at its most recent session also enacted a bill to
remove the requirement to register branch offices of dealers and invest-
ment advisers and remove branch office registration fees.73 Conse-
quently, the TSSB amended its rules instead to require notice filing of
branch offices without a registration fee for both dealers74 and invest-
ment advisers.75
D. MARKET OPERATORS
One common feature of state regulation of securities is the usual re-
quirement to register as a seller of securities before selling securities in
65. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 53, amended by 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 765
(H.B. 1342).
66. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4796 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6859 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.6 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
67. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4802 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6864 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.6 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
68. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4790 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6857 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 104.7 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
69. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 55.0041(a), added by 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch.
622 (S.B. 1200).
70. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4797 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6861 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.18 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
71. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4804 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6865 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.18 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
72. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4810 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6869 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 133.22 & 133.23 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
73. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-35B(1), amended by 2019 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. Ch. 772 (H.B. 1535).
74. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4794 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6839 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 115.1, 115.2, 115.4 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
75. See 44 Tex. Reg. 4801 (2019), adopted by 44 Tex. Reg. 6861 (2019) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 116.1, 116.2, 116.4 (2020)) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.).
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the state, and to register as an investment adviser before rendering in-
vestment advice.76 Registration infractions generally surface when apply-
ing or reapplying for registration.
The TSSB prosecuted an enforcement action against a dealer for the
failure of a registered agent to report various embarrassing required mat-
ters such as a felony offense.77 The TSSB also participated with securities
regulators in other states against a dealer for offering and selling unregis-
tered securities in Texas, failing to invest sufficient resources in person-
nel, systems, and operations to comply with state securities laws, failing to
supervise the flow of information to comply with state securities laws,
failing to supervise employees to ensure compliance with state securities
laws, and failing to maintain records necessary to ensure compliance with
state securities laws.78
The TSSB had several enforcement actions against investment advisers
and investment-adviser representatives. These involved: (1) failure to up-
date disclosure of fees and expenses, conflicts of interests, disciplinary
information, and business background of the investment adviser to clients
as required by TSSB rules;79 (2) failure to enforce supervisory procedures
requiring monthly review of discretionary accounts with the result of in-
vestments in short term leveraged exchange traded funds requiring daily
monitoring for several years causing 90% losses of investor funds;80 (3)
engaging in inequitable practices such as recommending stream of in-
come investments (periodic pension payments of distressed pensioners)
without disclosing the risks to clients and ignoring administrative orders
of other state securities boards and the SEC against the companies setting
up the stream of income investments81 or recommending to an elderly
couple that they invest 40% of their funds in illiquid real estate invest-
ment trusts sold by private placement and 50% of their funds in a single
private placement that failed even though each private placement had
76. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13(A).
77. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Agent Registration of Raymond Cui, No. REG19-
CAF-02, 2019 WL 861144 (Feb. 19, 2019) (reprimanded and administrative fine of
$5,000.00); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.9(a)(2) (2018) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.) (requir-
ing dealers and their agents to report felony criminal charges within thirty days).
78. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Dealer Registration of LPL Fin., LLC, No. IC19-
CAF-01, 2019 WL 1587111 (Apr. 10, 2019) (cease and desist order, administrative fine of
$450,000.00, contribution of $45,000.00 to the Investor Education Fund to educate Texas
investors, and a lengthy undertaking).
79. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Grove Capital Mgmt.,
Inc., No. IC19-CAF-03, 2019 WL 3083354 (July 9, 2019) (reprimanded, administrative fine
of $5,000.00, and an undertaking); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.11 (2019) (Tex. State
Sec. Bd.) (requiring disclosure of certain items to clients).
80. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Lowell & Co., No.
REG19-CAF-04, 2019 WL 3782736 (Aug. 2, 2019) (reprimand and administrative fine of
$40,000.00); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.10 (2019) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.) (requiring
supervision).
81. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Registration of LFS RIA, LLC and the
Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Clair Crossland, No. IC9-CAF-01, 2019 WL
2501791 (June 6, 2019) (reprimanded and undertaking to pay back $89,000.00 to clients
whose income streams defaulted); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-14(A)(3)
(punishment of dealers and investment advisers for inequitable practices).
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been approved by the employer investment adviser;82 (4) selling promis-
sory notes of the adviser’s wife’s business that went bankrupt to clients of
his employer investment adviser and serving as the business’s chief finan-
cial officer without disclosing the relationship to his employer investment
adviser;83 (5) advising more than five Texas residents within a year for a
fee without registration in Texas as an investment adviser although regis-
tered in another state and maintaining no place of business in Texas;84
and (6) engaging in fraudulent business practices such as recommending
stream of income investments and using the client moneys to pay other
clients when their stream of income investments became due or for per-
sonal expenses while failing to disclose this use and collecting unreasona-
ble management fees based on a percentage of assets in addition to
commissions on the sale of the stream of income investments.85
E. ENFORCEMENT
The TSSB generally enforces its requirements for registration through
emergency orders.86 Because con artists exploit current news and tech-
nology to confound unwary investors, the TSSB enumerates among the
top threats to investors: (1) cryptocurrencies since they are not backed by
the government and their price is not set by a centralized authority; (2)
oil and gas deals since investors can’t investigate the claim; and (3) for-
eign currency trading since it is volatile and can resulting in huge losses in
a few hours.87 The TSSB’s actions focus on these threats.
Due to the recent excitement involving cryptocurrency investments,
the TSSB conducts investigations of the promoters of these investments
82. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Mark A.
Trewitt, No. REG19-SUS-04, 2019 WL 2501793 (June 6, 2019) (suspended for ninety days
and an undertaking).
83. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Jason Hyson LeBlanc,
No. IC19-SUS-06, 2019 WL 5874364 (Oct. 31, 2019) (suspended for one year, placed on
probation for five years, and undertaking to repay $366,000.00 to the investors in the prom-
issory notes).
84. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Glob. Asset Mgmt. Grp.,
Inc., No. REG19-CAF-01, 2019 WL 861143 (Feb. 19, 2019) (reprimanded and administra-
tive fine of $7,500.00); Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Integrity RIA,
LLC, No. REG19-CAF-03, 2019 WL 1587110 (Apr. 1, 2019) (reprimanded and administra-
tive fine of $7,500.00); Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Registration of FRA Wealth
Mgmt., LLC, No. REG19-CAF-05, 2019 WL 3083353 (July 9, 2019) (reprimanded and ad-
ministrative fine of $20,000.00); Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Fru-
gal Fin. Ret. Plan Servs., LLC, No. REG19-CAF-06, 2019 WL 5874363 (Nov. 5, 2019)
(reprimanded and administrative fine of $5,000.00); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 116.1(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2019) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.) (exempting from registration investment
advisers that have no office in Texas and in the last year fewer than six clients that are
Texas residents).
85. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Marwieh
Advisory Servs., LLC, and the Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of George Augus-
tus Marwieh, No. IC19-REV-05, 2019 WL 5306636, at *2, *3 (Oct. 11, 2019) (registration
revoked and cease and desist order).
86. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23.
87. See Top 10 Investor Threats (Just in Time for the Holidays), TEX. ST. SEC. BD.
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/top-10-investor-threats-just-
time-holidays [https://perma.cc/KH63-MN97].
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who appeared to be using illegally or fraudulently online advertisements,
social media, and other public solicitations to attract Texas investors.88
Consequently, the TSSB had numerous actions against purveyors of
cryptocurrencies through public solicitations, resulting in cease and desist
orders and charges of selling unregistered securities, through unregistered
dealers, engaging in fraud by failing to make disclosures, and making ma-
terially misleading statements. One cryptocurrency mining program in-
volved an online Facebook advertisement directing investors to an online
platform to permit passive investment in industrial Bitcoin mining ap-
proximating ten-fold returns within three months without disclosing the
identity, business repute, qualifications of the principles, impact of future
government legislation, impact of technical failure, impact of hacking, or
impact of competition with other cryptocurrencies, and claiming they
were registered when they were not.89 Another cryptocurrency mining
program concerned a social media solicitation to invest in a cryptocur-
rency trading and mining operation returning 10% every four weeks,
claiming six years of operations, cryptocurrency experience of ten years
when the trader in a prior deal lost more than 99% of the investors’
money, and thirty years of experience in information technology, while
using unregistered dealers, and failing to disclose the strategies, cost of
the mining hardware, the security of the hardware and software, the im-
pact of technical failure, hacking, and competition from other cryptocur-
rencies.90 A third cryptocurrency trading program dealt with social media
solicitations through Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook, selling cryptocur-
rency investment plans purchased with Bitcoin with returns in Bitcoin,
falsely claiming to be registered in the United Kingdom, to be traded
over the counter, to have a Texas office when not registered with the
Texas Secretary of State, to be a registered investment company, to have
a law firm and auditing firm, and failing to disclose the trading strategy,
the company’s financial information, the impact of future government
legislation, technical failure, hacking, or competition with other
cryptocurrencies.91 A fourth cryptocurrency mining program dealt with
an online global marketplace solicitation, directing investors to a
webpage of the mining company to fund their cryptocurrency wallet with
88. See Widespread Fraud Found in Cryptocurrency Offerings, TEX. ST. SEC. BD. (Apr.
10, 2018), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-puplications/enforcement-report-widespread-
fraud-found-cryptocurrecy-offering [https://perma.cc/PW2Y-GG8G]. The TSSB was the
first state securities regulator to enter an enforcement order against a cryptocurrency firm
and also has entered the most of any state. See The Investor’s Guide to Cryptocurrency
Offerings, TEX. ST. SEC. BD., https://www.ssb.texas.gov/cryptocurrency-resources [https://
perma.cc/TL7Z-YWPR].
89. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re TintXMiningPool and Maxi Samantha Fortune, No.
ENF-19-CDO-1781, 2019 WL 2911642, at *2 (June 28, 2019) (emergency cease and desist
order).
90. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re My Crypto Mine and Mark Steven Royer, No. ENF-
18-CDO-1771, 2018 WL 6307934, at *3 (Nov. 27, 2019) (emergency cease and desist order).
91. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re PK Crypto Inv. aka PK-Crypto Inv., Peggy Kay
Brendan, and Janet A. Osborn, No. ENF-20-CDO-1791, 2019 WL 5306638, at *1 (Oct. 14,
2019) (emergency cease and desist order).
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Bitcoin for lucrative profits over a short term, falsely claiming to be regis-
tered in the United Kingdom and to only have qualified investors for a
private placement exempt from the federal securities acts without qualify-
ing potential investors or filing the required forms with the SEC, using
investors and recruit representatives to solicit new investors without re-
gistration as agents, and failing to disclose the identities of the principals,
their qualifications, the type of hardware to mine cryptocurrencies, the
costs of the mining hardware, the procedures for overcoming hardware
failures, and the impact of future government legislation, technical fail-
ure, hacking, or competition with other cryptocurrencies.92
The TSSB also had enforcement actions against several oil and gas
drilling programs. One oil and gas drilling program for oil in Oklahoma
involved unsolicited electronic mail messages to Texas residents promis-
ing annualized rates to return between 50–70% and directed investors to
a website (1) touting the business repute of the principal without disclos-
ing he had two prior oil and gas programs declare bankruptcy and was
sued for a third; (2) claiming lucrative profits if the drilling duplicated the
enormous productivity of a nearby well failing to disclose the much lower
true productivity of that well; and (3) without disclosing a foreign state
action against another principal.93 Another involved an oil and gas drill-
ing program in Illinois through the social media platform LinkedIn that
promised Texas investors lucrative returns of 100% the first two years
and monthly income for twenty years, with the right to exit the invest-
ment after three years, by touting an individual with several honors as the
operator without disclosing that the actual operator was another com-
pany or disclosing any information about it. The venture also failed to
disclose risks associated with the exploration, to register the agents as
dealers or the interests as securities, and to disclose any information
about the entity that would repurchase the working interests after three
years.94
The TSSB also had several enforcement actions against currency trad-
ing programs. One currency trading program made online promises of a
ten-fold return in fourteen days, sold unregistered investments through
unregistered dealers, failed to explain the identity of the traders and their
qualifications and experience, failed to disclose the risks of foreign inter-
est rates and currency exchange rates on the currency’s value, and failed
to disclose the risks of leverage and information on the insurance policy
92. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Crypto Miner Ltd. aka Cyp Miner Ltd. aka Cyp
Miner and Elizabeth Frazier, No. ENF-20-CDO-1790, 2019 WL 5306633, at *1–4 (Oct. 14,
2019) (emergency cease and desist order).
93. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Woodland Res., LLC; Woodland Operating, LLC,
aka WY Woodland Operating, LLC; Michael E. Patman; Jeremy Bryan Yowell aka JB
Yowell; and Brett Kroh, No. ENF-19-CDO-1783, 2019 WL 3083355, at *4–5 (July 10, 2019)
(emergency cease and desist order).
94. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Kelcas Corp.; Kelcas Ohio River Oil, LLC; OIK
Global Consulting Ptd Ltd. aka HOK Glob. Consulting Ptd Ltd.; Wilhelm B. Lilliehook;
and Hok-Lam Chan aka Hok Lam Chan, No. ENF-20-CDO-1787, 2019 WL 4597384, at
*3–4 (Sept. 16, 2019) (emergency cease and desist order).
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guaranteeing the return.95 Another currency trading program made on-
line promises of eleven-fold returns in one week, guaranteeing the profit-
ability and claiming that no risk was involved, without being registered as
a dealer and not registering the investment plans, and failing to disclose
the agent’s qualifications, experience, strategies, or financials.96 A third
currency trading program was similar to phishing, using a Facebook list-
ing to advertise and get access to the investor’s Bitcoin accounts to trans-
fer the Bitcoins to the trader’s account and not disclosing trading
qualifications, trading experience, trading strategies, or risks, and falsely
claiming to be registered.97
The TSSB also had an action triggered by a registered agent reporting
suspected financial exploitation of an elderly person who liquidated their
accounts to invest in precious metals.98 The perpetrator was using unso-
licited telephone calls and an internet website to solicit those aged sixty-
five to ninety requesting information about their securities holdings, ad-
vising them securities holdings were not safe, to sell their securities and
invest in precious metals, claiming not to charge any fees for the purchase
of precious metals when the perpetrator pocketed the spread between the
sales price and the wholesale price of the precious metals, while not being
registered as an investment adviser and failing to disclose the principals,
their qualifications and experience in determining suitable products, any
complaints from investors, and any risks in investing in precious metals.99
III. SECURITIES FRAUD COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL AND TEXAS SECURITIES ACTS
One major reason legislatures passed securities acts was to facilitate
investors’ actions to recover their monies through a simplified fraud ac-
tion that removed scienter and privity, the most difficult elements to
prove in a common-law fraud action. These securities act changes gener-
ally apply only to the primary market. When investors purchase in the
secondary market their actions reintroduce these obstacles.
The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes.
Therefore, Texas courts look to federal decisions under the federal stat-
utes to interpret the TSA provisions with similar language.100 As a result,
95. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Forex and Bitcoin Trader aka Forex and Bitcoin
Traders aka FX & Bitcoin Trader aka FX & Bitcoin, No. ENF-19-CDO-1785, 2019 WL
3782735, at *1–2 (Aug. 6, 2019) (emergency cease and desist order).
96. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Madeline O’Farrell, No. ENF-19-CDO-1780, 2019
WL 2911640, at *2 (June 28, 2019) (emergency cease and desist order).
97. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Mikhail Rania Safiya, No. ENF-19-CDO-1779, 2019
WL 2911641, at *1–2 (June 28, 2019) (emergency cease and desist order).
98. See Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re TMTE, Inc., aka Metals.com, Chase Metals, LLC,
and Chase Metals, Inc.; Walter Vera; Michael Kendall, and Athena Hunter, No. ENF-19-
CDO-1777, 2019 WL 1988529, at *1–2 (May 1, 2019) (emergency cease and desist order).
99. Id. at *3.
100. See Highland Capital Mgmt., LP, v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193
S.W.3d 87, 102 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also George
Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1129–30 n.3 (2013) (discussing High-
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there is an interest in Fifth Circuit securities law fraud opinions. Fraud
actions under the federal statutes generally possess six elements: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
with a purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and
(6) “loss causation,” that is, a causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the loss.101 The last element comes from the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).102
A. ADEQUATELY PLEADING MISSTATEMENTS
UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
The PSLRA requires a higher standard of pleading misstatements and
omissions than the ordinary standard under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.103 The Fifth Circuit requires plaintiffs to identify the speaker,
the misleading statement, when the statement was made, where the state-
ment was made, and why the statement was misleading.104 In Masel v.
Villarreal, the Fifth Circuit dealt with a doctor and his business partner
who were induced to join a business enterprise through material misrep-
resentations and omissions about the effectiveness of the perpetrators’
medical billing service.105 The district court had dismissed for failure to
state a claim of securities fraud.106 The Fifth Circuit examined the seven
misstatements and three omissions to determine whether they were ac-
tionable. The statement that the defendants had superior billing proce-
dures capable of generating the highest payouts failed the PSLRA’s
particularity test since there was no allegation the statement was false
when made.107 Two other misstatements failed the particularity test since
they failed to specify the place where the statements were made.108 With
respect to two omissions, that the defendants intended to set up compet-
ing businesses and plaintiffs would not receive compensation for most
claims, the plaintiffs failed to disclose when a given disclosure should
have been made.109 The third omission, that there would be conflicts of
interest, failed since the pleading did not allege that the conflict existed at
the time it should have been disclosed (when asked by the plaintiff
doctor).110
land Capital Mgmt.); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 60 SMU L. REV.
1293–1302 (2007) (discussing Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc.).
101. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (discussing commission
rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018)).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012).
103. See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
104. See Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 866 (5th Cir. 2003).
105. Masel v. Villarreal, 924 F.3d 734, 739–40 (5th Cir. 2019).
106. Id. at 739.
107. Id. at 748.
108. Id. at 748–49 (plaintiffs claimed they were made in unspecified correspondence
since they had typos, but this was not particular enough).
109. Id. at 749. The court followed the reasoning in Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470
F.3d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 2006), which required disclosure of when omissions should have
appeared under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
110. Masel, 924 F.3d at 749.
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However, the remaining four misstatements, two relating to the capac-
ity of the defendants to perform and two relating to the profits defend-
ants could generate, were adequately plead since the failure to perform
and generate profits indicated doubt that the defendant had the requisite
skills or ability to generate profits initially.111 With respect to the four
properly alleged misstatements, the Fifth Circuit considered the scienter
pleadings.112 With respect to the defendant who ran the medical billing
services company, the Fifth Circuit found scienter was adequately plead
since that defendant knew the representations were based on metrics and
information under that defendant’s control, but with respect to the other
defendant, the plaintiffs failed to establish the defendant understood the
algorithm, how it worked, or even if it existed.113 Consequently, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court with respect to the four adequately
pleaded misstatements and affirmed the removal of one of the
defendants.114
B. SCIENTER FOR PUBLICLY DISCLOSING DETRIMENTAL
INFORMATION UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
For scienter, the federal heightened pleading rule requires the com-
plaint to state with particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud
while the PSLRA requires the complaint to specify the fraudulent state-
ment, reasons why the statement is false, and facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the fraudster had the requisite intent.115 In the Fifth Cir-
cuit, scienter requires an “intent to deceive . . . or that severe recklessness
in which the danger of misleading [investors] is either known to the de-
fendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of
it.”116 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the group pleading doc-
trine, so the scienter must be of a specific issuer officer and scienter may
not be implied from prospectuses, registration statements, and press
releases.117
Attorneys for shareholders in securities class action continue to have
difficulty pleading facts giving a strong inference of scienter when dealing
with corporations trying to properly disclose meaningful information dur-
ing a trying event such as a bear attack while trying to develop software
to help sell oilfield products, handle an oil pipeline spill, trying to switch
to online selling of products, or adjust to government changes in a Medi-
111. Id. at 749–51.
112. Id. at 751–52.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 752.
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“[T]he complaint
shall . . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.”).
116. See Southland Secs. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir.
2004) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929,
961–62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)); see George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU
L. REV. 1135, 1155–56 (2005) (discussing Southland).
117. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 366.
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caid audit program. And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
continues to use the PLSRA as Congress intended, to eliminate illegiti-
mate securities fraud lawsuits.118
In Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Flotek Industries, Inc., the Fifth
Circuit dealt with a pleading relying solely on misstatements as evidence
of scienter for a company whose stock price significantly declined after a
financial publication reported that data released earlier by the company
was in error.119 The company marketed an oilfield product to improve the
productivity of oil and gas wells and had developed software to compare
the productivity of oil and gas wells that used the company’s product and
those that did not.120 Before the release of the financial publication, the
company’s chief executive officer had conducted several investor confer-
ence calls in which he used the word “conclusive” to describe the
software’s results, described the software’s data as “un-adjusted” when it
used an algorithm to compare single wells with other wells under lease,
used incorrect data in comparing wells, and claimed that the data was
“back checked and validated” when there were no internal controls to
insure the integrity of the data from a third party.121 Immediately after
the release of the financial publication, the company issued a press re-
lease conceding the financial publication was correct and ascribing the
error to data provided by that third party.122 A class action on behalf of
the shareholders was filed alleging violations of Exchange Act Section
10(b) for securities fraud and Section 20(a) for control person liability.123
For scienter, the investors pled the actions of the chief executive officer at
the various investor conference calls. The district court dismissed for fail-
ure to satisfy the pleading requirements for scienter.124 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed.125 The word “conclusive” is subject to many interpretations and
does not contribute to a strong inference of scienter, especially when the
software did have some economic benefit.126 The other offered pleadings
lacked a pleading that the chief executive officer knew at the time of the
investor conference calls that the software used an algorithm, that the
data was incorrect, or that the company lacked quality controls over
third-party data and such misstatements were not sufficiently obvious to
infer scienter as severely reckless.127
In Police and Fire Retirement System of Detroit v. Plains All American
Pipeline, LP, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confronted a
pipeline company dealing with an oil spill in California that contended it
118. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995).
119. Alaska Elec’l Pension Fund v. Flotek Indus., Inc., 915 F.3d 975, 980 (5th Cir. 2019).
120. Id. at 979.
121. Id. at 982.
122. Id. at 980.
123. Id. at 981; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (2012).
124. Flotek Indus., Inc., 915 F.3d at 981.
125. Id. at 987.
126. Id. at 983. The court followed the reasoning in Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Tr.
Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2008).
127. Flotek Indus., Inc., 915 F.3d at 983–85.
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was in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, during which
time the stock of the company declined and after which the company was
indicted for several felonies and misdemeanors by the federal and state
governments for violation of those laws and regulations.128 The investors
sued under the Securities Act for misstatements in the company’s SEC
filings and under the Exchange Act for fraud.129 The district court dis-
missed the action for failing to plead scienter with particularity.130 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed.131 The court found most of the alleged misstate-
ments not misleading, including those in filings with the SEC such as as-
pirational statements about the company’s commitment to safety, belief
statements that the company was in compliance with law also broadly
applicable to the other pipelines of the company, statements of internal
procedures that did exist although they failed to function for the oil spill,
recitation of facts at a moment in time that further investigation later
contradicted, third-party statements, and opinion statements.132 The Se-
curities Act claim has no scienter requirement, but since the court found
all of those statements made in SEC filings not misleading, the dismissal
of the Securities Act claim was affirmed.133 The only two false statements
were not made in SEC filings so the Exchange Act’s scienter requirement
applied.134 The investors failed to tie the misstatements made on the com-
pany’s website to any specific officer and the court found the misstate-
ment not of a technical nature requiring senior level corporate officers to
have been involved in its creation.135 With respect to a misstatement
made by a corporate officer to a legislative committee that there was no
indication that anything was wrong with the pipeline, when the company
knew that over 50% of the pipeline wall had corroded, since there was no
allegation about that corporate officer’s level of knowledge concerning
the matter.136
In Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Michigan v. Pier 1 Im-
ports, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit considered an
investor lawsuit against a retailer of home furnishings for failing to dis-
close that the retailer’s inventory was flooded with excess merchandise
created in response to consumer demand for online shopping that carried
a significant markdown risk because it had inventory that was too sea-
sonal and subject to changing consumer tastes.137 The investors sued for
securities fraud under the Exchange Act after a series of partial correc-
128. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, LP, 777 F. App’x 726,
727–28 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
129. Id. at 728; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 78j(b) (2012).
130. Plains All Am. Pipeline, LP, 777 F. App’x at 732.
131. Id. at 733.
132. Id. at 731–33.
133. Id. at 730, 733.
134. Id. at 731.
135. Id. at 731–32.
136. Id. at 732.
137. Mun. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Mich. v. Pier 1 Imps., Inc., 935 F.3d 424, 427–28 (5th Cir.
2019).
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tive disclosures, such as announcing the company had higher costs be-
cause of unplanned supply chain expenses, that the company had to turn
to clearance activity to sell off the extra inventory, and that it would take
eighteen months before inventory would be in line with demand, causing
the stock price to eventually plummet 75%.138 The district court dis-
missed the action for failure to plead a strong inference of scienter.139
The Fifth Circuit affirmed.140 The investors relied on three categories of
scienter allegations concerning motive, knowledge of high inventory, and
knowledge of markdown risk.141 For motive allegations, the investors re-
lied on job protection and incentive compensation, both previously held
insufficient by the Fifth Circuit.142 For knowledge of high inventory alle-
gations, the investors contended that such knowledge equated with
knowledge of the markdown risk, but the Fifth Circuit rejected this since
the officers could reasonably believe that they could solve the inventory
problem without resorting to markdowns.143 Moreover, the high inven-
tory allegations suffered from other defects, such as being based on
knowledge outside the class period, publicly disclosed information so the
officers were not trying to hide the problem, and vague statements of
confidential witnesses without explaining what the problems were.144
With respect to the knowledge of markdown risk, the investors pleaded
(1) the company was a trend-based retailer, but it also had long standing
collections of products; (2) the company had extraordinary markdown
sales shortly after saying there was no markdown risk, but temporal prox-
imity is weak evidence of fraud; (3) there were numerous red flags of
impending markdowns, but these were from an expert report stricken
from the record; and (4) the theory that the SEC rules requiring disclo-
sure of known trends145 includes disclosure of markdown risk, which the
Fifth Circuit refused to adopt.146
In a case reported last year, Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Asar, in
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found a class action
complaint sufficient with respect to one of the perpetrators, the chief fi-
nancial officer, the Fifth Circuit withdrew and substituted a new opin-
ion.147 The issuer was a leading provider of orthotic and prosthetic
138. Id. at 428–29; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
139. Pier 1 Imps., Inc., 935 F.3d at 429.
140. Id. at 437.
141. Id. at 430.
142. Id. at 431 (citing Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2002)).
143. Id. at 432.
144. Id. at 432–34.
145. The rule is Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2019). The
Second Circuit accepts the theory, while the Ninth Circuit rejects it. See Stratte-McClure v.
Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015); In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d
1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014).
146. Pier 1 Imps. Inc., 935 F.3d. at 435–37.
147. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Asar, 768 F. App’x 175, 176 (5th Cir. 2019), with-
drawing Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Asar, 898 F.3d 648, 662 (5th Cir. 2018). See George
Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 391–404 (2019) (discussing
the original 2018 case).
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patient care services with most of its revenue coming from reimburse-
ments for its services by public and private insurers.148 The issuer devel-
oped accounting problems after Congress expanded the Medicare audit
program by failing to collect the required documentation forcing a return
of the reimbursements and by implementing a new data management sys-
tem resulting in fewer sales since employees had to spend significant
amounts of time transitioning patient data to the new system.149 For both
of these accounting problems, the issuer failed to increase its reserve for
disallowed Medicare sales.150 The document containing the properly
pleaded misstatements related to the issuer’s audit committee report sub-
mitted to the SEC on Form 8-K suggesting that the chief financial officer
and others had engaged in inappropriate accounting practices to enhance
the issuer’s reported earnings.151 The district court had found these state-
ments as not adequately pleading a strong inference of scienter.152 Al-
though the Fifth Circuit found them supportive of and contributing
slightly to an inference of scienter, they did not arise to the level of a
strong inference of scienter, and so the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal.153
C. INVESTOR ERRORS UNDER THE TEXAS SECURITIES ACT
Lawyers representing investors and defendants fared no better under
the TSA. They made several errors in bringing their lawsuits and in draft-
ing their pleadings.
In Goughnour v. Patterson, Trustee of Deborah Patterson, the Twelfth
Tyler Court of Appeals dealt with a trust beneficiary contending the trus-
tee and his business partner had pilfered the trust for his own benefit and
engaged in subterfuge to keep it hidden.154 The securities fraud action
under the TSA involved an equity interest in a private limited company
developing a residential subdivision made in July 2007 that failed, losing
all the investment and later described as a loan.155 The trustee disclosed
that the trust received no ownership interest in the private limited com-
pany in March 2011.156 The beneficiary brought suit for violation of the
TSA in November 2015, which the district court dismissed in granting the
trustee’s motion for summary judgment.157 The court of appeals affirmed
noting that the TSA requires investors to bring suit within three years of
148. Asar, 768 F. App’x at 177.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 178.
152. Id. at 179.
153. Id. at 188–89.
154. Goughnour v. Patterson, Tr. of Deborah Patterson, No. 12-17-00234-CV, 2019 WL
1031575, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 5, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (also suing for
breach of fiduciary duty, misuse of trust property, breach of personal guaranty, and breach
of contract).
155. Id. at *1, *11.
156. Id. at *11.
157. Id. at *1, *11 (misstatement or omission in connection with the sale of a security);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2).
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discovery (here four years ago) and no more than five years after sale
(here eight years ago).158
In Matter of Life Partners Holdings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit confronted a bankruptcy trustee suing, on behalf of inves-
tors, those licensees that aided the bankrupt entities in marketing securi-
ties (life settlements, namely interests in life insurance contracts of
terminally ill elderly) that used inaccurate life expectancies to set the
price of the life settlements that failed to return the amounts claimed
while disseminating the bankrupt’s statements that their predictions were
accurate and took commissions and fees far in excess of the standard
commission.159 The complaint, however, failed to allege which sections of
the TSA the licensees violated, which licensees violated the TSA failing
to give them notice of the claims against them, and which investors still
owned fractional interests in the life settlements to determine whether
the remedy was rescission or damages.160 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the securities fraud action as
proper.161
Lawyers representing securities fraud defendants similarly made erro-
neous assertions. In Kubbernus v. ECAL Partners, Ltd., the First Hous-
ton Court of Appeals encountered investors who invested in a Delaware
limited partnership that was to buy stock and convertible debentures in a
Delaware corporation whose sole subsidiary was a Texas corporation op-
erating a satellite telecommunication operation in Houston.162 Although
the private placement memorandum stated the limited partnership would
acquire ownership in the Texas corporation and convert the debentures,
the promoters formed a competing group, acquired the Texas corporation
and the debentures for the competing group, leaving the investors with
nothing.163 The perpetrators brought in two subsequent groups of inves-
tors, one set mostly foreign, and the others shareholders of a public com-
pany through an exchange of stock without disclosing the fraud on the
initial group of investors.164 The investors brought a securities fraud ac-
tion under the TSA and after a jury trial judgment was entered in their
favor.165 The perpetrators defense against the foreign investors was that
the TSA did not provide a remedy for foreign investors.166 This is con-
158. Goughnour, 2019 WL 1031575, at *11; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33H(2).
159. In re Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d 103, 111–13 (5th Cir. 2019). The case
also dealt with claims of actual fraudulent transfer, constructive fraudulent transfer, prefer-
ential transfer, avoidance and disallowance, equitable subordination, and breach of fiduci-
ary duty. Id. at 117, 119, 121, 122, 125. See also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation,
2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 437, 439–48 (2016) (securities fraud litigation against Life Part-
ners, Inc., one of the bankruptcies).
160. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d at 124.
161. Id.
162. Kubbernus v. ECAL Partners, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 444, 451–53 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
163. Id. at 453–54.
164. Id. at 455.
165. Id. at 450.
166. Id. at 471–73.
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trary to the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion that the TSA’s registration
provisions even apply to prohibit the sale of unregistered securities from
Texas, to non-Texas residents.167 In the case at hand, the offices and activ-
ities of the Delaware entities were in Houston, Texas, and the stock and
debentures were Texas based securities.168 Another perpetrator defense
was that the evidence did not show that their misrepresentations and
omissions caused the damages to the investors.169 But it is well known
that the TSA does not have loss causation as an element of the securities
fraud action.170 Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court.171
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dealt with several at-
tempts by promoters to design investments in such a manner to avoid
compliance with the securities laws claiming the investments were not se-
curities. For two joint ventures, the Fifth Circuit found one joint venture
did involve a security since the co-venturers had no effective power to
exercise control over the joint venture, while for the other one the Fifth
Circuit found a joint venture interest not a security because the co-ven-
turers actually participated in controlling the joint venture. For a limited
partnership, the Fifth Circuit found that the limited partner that managed
the limited partnership through a separate service agreement did not de-
stroy the security nature of his limited partnership interest since the abil-
ity to manage the limited partnership was not in the limited partnership’s
formation documents. The Fifth Circuit also determined that a grant of an
employee option is not a “sale” of a security since the employee does not
part with anything of value. And the Fifth Circuit joined the Texas Su-
preme Court in determining that life settlements are securities as invest-
ment contracts since their return depends on the presale efforts of the
creator of the life settlements just as is the case with bonds.
In contrast, the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals’ scope issue dealt
with the impact of free speech in connection with aiders and abettors
under the TSA. Unfortunately, the Texas Anti-SLAPP statute did not
apply in the current case since there was no communication constituting
the exercise of free speech. So, the court of appeals left that issue open
for some future day.
167. Id. at 474 (citing Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 435, 439–40
(Tex. 2007)). The court of appeals noted that it had also so ruled in Rio Grande Oil Co. v.
State, 539 S.W.2d 917, 921–22 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.),
as had the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Texas in Baron v. Strassner, 7 F.
Supp. 2d 871, 872 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
168. Kubbernus, 574 S.W.3d at 475–76.
169. Id. at 485.
170. Id. (citing Duperier v. Tex. State Bank, 28 S.W.3d 740, 753–54 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2000, pet. dism’d by agr.).
171. Id. at 490.
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The TSSB made a number of changes to its rules to comply with recent
legislation. One statute called for the administrative bodies to negotiate
with interested parties in making rules so the TSSB set up a procedure for
that participation. Another statute permitted those with criminal convic-
tions not relating to the occupational license to obtain an occupational
license, so the TSSB revised its rules to permit such individuals to obtain
a preliminary determination before training and to allow such individuals
to be licensed as dealers and investment advisers. A third statute allowed
resident military spouses to use out of state occupational licenses in Texas
so the TSSB revised its rules to allow those military spouses to become
dealers and investment advisers. A fourth statute removed the registra-
tion requirements for branch offices of dealers and investment advisers,
so the TSSB set up a notice procedure for such branches.
The TSSB’s enforcement efforts against dealers focused on failing to
report embarrassing matters such as felony convictions and on failing to
follow supervisory procedures of employed dealer agents. The enforce-
ment efforts against investment advisers concerned failure to disclose
conflicts and business background to clients, failure to enforce supervi-
sory procedures, recommending stream of income investments without
disclosing the risks to clients, engaging in a side business without disclos-
ing it to the employing investment adviser firm, advising more than five
Texas residents without registering, and using client moneys to pay other
clients.
The TSSB’s enforcement efforts against threats to investors involved
numerous actions dealing with (1) cryptocurrency mining programs with-
out disclosing the miners’ backgrounds and the risks involved; (2) oil and
gas drilling projects without disclosing the driller’s past failures and the
risks involved; (3) currency trading programs without disclosing the risks
and the traders’ qualifications; and (4) an exploitation of the elderly get-
ting them to swap their safe investments for investments in precious met-
als without disclosing the risks involved with precious metals.
For the federal fraud action, the Fifth Circuit treated several poorly
pleaded petitions. The case dealing with misstatements, the petitioner for
the fraudulent statements failed to allege where the statements were
made and that the statements were false when made and for the omis-
sions when they should be disclosed. The cases involving a strong infer-
ence of scienter dealt with corporations trying to properly disclose
meaningful information during a trying event. For the case of the issuer
trying to develop software to help sell oilfield products, the petitioner did
not allege the officer knew the statement was false when made. For the
case of handling an oil pipeline spill, the petitioner failed to identify
which officer made the statements made online, failed to allege the of-
ficer testifying before the legislature knew the statement was false and
most of the alleged misstatements were aspirational and belief. For the
issuer trying to adjust to online retailing, the Fifth Circuit noted that
knowledge of a high inventory is not equivalent to knowledge of the risk
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of a markdown and that some of the misstatements came outside the class
period, and refused to adopt a theory that the SEC requirement to dis-
close trends includes disclosure of the risk of markdowns. For the issuer
adjusting to changes in Medicare procedures, the auditor committee’s re-
port that the chief financial officer engaged in appropriate accounting
practices to enhance reported earnings, although supportive and contrib-
uting slightly to scienter, was not the required strong inference of
scienter.
For the fraud actions under the TSA, the parties fared no better. For
the dispute of the trust funds, the statute of limitations had expired for
the petitioner. For the life settlement case, the petitioner failed to allege
which section of the TSA was violated, which defendant violated the
TSA, and which investors still owned their life settlements to determine
whether the remedy was for damages or rescission. And for the Delaware
issuer operating in Texas, the defendant claimed erroneously that the
TSA does not apply to foreign investors when the investment is sold from
Texas and that the TSA requires a causation element.
